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IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

WESTERN STATES REFINING
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

8602

BLAIR BERRY,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF F:ACTS
On June 7, 1956, plaintiff commenced this action in
the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County by
serving a ten day summons on defendant. The complaint
was filed in time and, thereafter, the defendant, appearing specially, filed a motion to quash service of summons
on the ground that service was obtained by inveigling or
enticing the defendant into the state of Utah by deceit,
artifice or trick, and on the further ground that, unde:r
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the facts of this case, defendant was immune from service
of summons at the time summon.s was served upon him.
The trial court denied the motion to quash, defendant
petitioned this court for perrnission to appeal from s.aid
interlocutory order and said permission was granted.
Defendant is a resident of the state of Idaho, has
been such for more than thirty years and has never been
a resident of the state ofUtah (R. 11). When this action
was commenced he was the owner of one service station
at Rexburg, Idaho, and leased a second .service station
at Rexburg from the plaintiff. The lease was embodied
in a written agreement dated August 25, 1955, which .also
contained provisions which the plaintiff contends require
the defendant to sell only the petroleum products of the
plaintiff. On December 28, 1955, provisions were added
relating to credit card charges. Beginning ~hartly after
the first of 1956, and continuing to date, the parties hereto have disagreed over the interpretation of the terms of
the said vvritten agreements, and over \Vhether plaintiff
has been violating their terms. Plaintiff contends that
said agreements require defendant to sell pl_aintiff 's
petroleum product.s exclusively and defendant contends
that they do not. In .addition,· there has been a contra-·
versy in relation to the quality of the petroleun1 products
being delivered to defendant by plaintiff under the agreenlents. These controversies are the subject of the suit
connnenced by plaintiff by the disputed service of srunmons.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The President of the plaintiff corporation i.s W, S.
Wagstaff, who is also a member of the bar of this court.
Plaintiff's General Sales Manager is Neal R. Olson and
plaintiff's attorney at the time this action was commenced
.was. Richard .G. Boren, who was also. a employee of .the
Sales Department under Mr. Olson.
Sometime around the 1st of June, 1956, !{r. Olson
·instructed Mr. Boren to make a trip to Idaho in the company of a Mr. Bruner, an Idaho managerial emplQyee
of the plaintiff, and among other things to contact. the
·defendant at Rexburg, Idaho, to. see if he could work. out
the differences and resolve the controversies existing bet\veen plaintiff and defendant. He instructed. Mr. Boren
that if he couldn't work out the differences, he should
ask. the defendant to come to plaintiff's plant .at Woods
Cross, Utah, for a conference so that everyone could sit
down together and try to work out said differences (R.
47.). Mr. Boren \vent to Idaho and, sometime during June
4, 5, or 6, stopped at the station of defendant and, in the
company of Mr. Bruner, conferred with defendant in
relation to the .aforesaid items of controversy. There is
a conflict between the testimony of defendant and ~fr.
Boren as to exactly what was said but, according to.l\Ir.
Boren, he told defendant that the plaintiff company was
dissatisfied with defendant's leasing .a station of plaintiff,
building a station of his own and transferring the (3U.stomers from plaintiff's station to defendant's, with defendant's selling products from other sources in contravention of their written agreement and with certain credit
card changes (R. 63 and 64). No agreement could be
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reached in relation to the items in controver.sy and Mr.
Boren requested that defendant come to Salt Lake City
and discuss these matters with the officers of the plaintiff company and attempt to settle the controversy. Defendant stated that he would do so as soon a.s it could be
arranged.
In compliance with Mr. Boren's request, defendant,
on June 7, 1956, drove directly from Rexburg, Idaho, to
the offices of the plaintiff corporation at Woods Cross,
Utah. The sole purpose of defendant's trip into Utah wa.s
the conference with the officers of the plaintiff company
(R. 25), and, as soon as it was terminated he drove directly back to Rexburg (R. 17 and 18).
At the conference defendant discussed the items of
controversy with ~Ir. Boren, Mr. Wagstaff, and Mr.
Olson. While the conference was going on in Mr. Olson's
office, Mr. Wagstaff, in his own office and out of the
defendant's presence!, instructed ~fr. Boren to prepare a
summons and have the same ready to serve on defendant
if no agreement could be reached (R. 43). Pursuant to
that instruction, Mr. Boren had a peace officer called to
the plant and prep~ared the summons \Vhich was eventually served on the defendant. ~fr. Royal A. Reynolds,
North S.alt Lake Township 1\farshal, can1e to plaintiff's
office in response to said request, and waited for some
tilne in the plaintiff's \Vaiting roon1. "\\7hen ~Ir. Boren
felt that no agree1nent was being reached, he called Mr.
Reynolds and had hin1 con1e into the conference room and
serve the sunnnons upon the defendant. According to
Mr. Boren, the defendant 'vas surprised by the appearSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ance of the Marshal and the serv1ce of the summons
(R. 61).
At the hearing on the motion to quash there was evidence prese·nted in the form of the testimony of the
plaintiff's officers indicating that the possibility of suing
defendant had been given some consideration prior to
the time he was invited to come to Utah. Mr. Boren, attorney for defendant at the time summons was served,
indicated that he had given some thought to the question
of whether defendant, being an Idaho resident, could be
sued in Utah, and had been under the impression that,
since it was an action on a contract, suit could be commenced in either jurisdiction. There is testimony that
the possibility of suing defendant had been considered by
~Ir. Wagstaff, President of the plaintiff corporation, and
by Mr. Olson, the Sales Manager prior to the invitation
to the defendant. In these regards, however, it must be
borne in mind that the ruling of the trial court denyin~
the motion to quash would imply a finding that there was
no enticement or inveiglement by means of deceit, artifice or trick. For this reason it must be assumed that
the determinations of fact were against the position of
this defendant.
STATE1\1ENT OF POINTS

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS HEREIN BE·CAUSE AT THE TIME THE SUMMONS WAS SERVED
ON DEFENDANT HE WAS IMMUNE FROM SERVICE OF
SUMMONS IN THIS ACTION.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 'T·O QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS HEREIN BE·CAUSE AT THE TIME THE SUMMONS WAS SERVED
ON DEFENDANT HE WAS IMMUNE FROM SERVICE OF
SUMMONS IN THIS ACTION.

Defendant contends that he was immune from service of summons at the time summons was served on him
in this action for the reason that a nonresident who
come~s into the jurisdiction at the invitation or request
of a resident for the sole purpose of conferring with the
resident in regard to the se,ttlement of a then existing
controversy between them is inunune from service of
summons in a suit involving the controversy which was
the .subject of the conference, during his attendance at the
conference .and for a sufficient period thereafter to enable him to return to his home. This is the rule established by State ex rel Ellan v. District Court of Eighth
Judicial District in and for Cascade County et al., 97
Mont. 229, 33 P. (2d) 526, 93 A.L.R. 865, decided in 1934,
a case which is exactly in point with the instant case.
In the El.lan case, supra, Nicholas Ellan (who, like
the defendant here, 'va.s a resident of the state of Idaho)
was involved in a controversy 'vith a construction firm
called House and Comerford, and with one Sam Orino,
in relation to the rental of certain trucks and equipment
belonging to Ellan "'"hich 'vere used by House and Comerford as subcontractors under a prin1e contract let by the
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state of Montana to said Sam Orino for the cons:truction
of certain highways in Montana. Ellan claimed rental
for the machines and House and Comerford denied liability and counterclaimed. At House's request Ellan
accompanied House from Idaho to Montana, and the declared objeet of the trip was a conference with Orino and
the officers of the Montana Highway Commission in an
effort to se~ttle the controversy. House and Ellan arrived
at Helena, Montana on December 7, and on December 8
Ellan was served with summons and a copy of the complaint in an action by House and Comerford
concerning
..
the controversy which was the subject of the proposed
conference. Ellan appeared specially in the action and
.
moved that service be quashed on the ground that he was
enticed into the state of Montana for the purpose of
service by a promise of compromise and settlement of the
controversy between him and the plaintiffs. In his affidavit on s.aid motion to quash Ellan stated that House
made false and fraudulent representations to him under
preitense of discussing a compromise for the purpose of
enticing him into the State in order to secure service on
him, and House, in his counter-affidavit, sta;ted that he
was acting in good faith and in the belief that a compromise could be effected. The trial court found in favor of
House and Comerford and against Ellan and denied the
motion to quash. Ellan sought and secured a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Montana. The opinion was written in the action for the- writ of prohibition.
-

-

Much of the case involves the que.stion of whether
prohibition will lie under such circumstances and the
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~fontana

court detennined that it would. The court then
1noved to a consideration of the question of whether the
service of summons on Ellan could be sustained and concluded that, even giving full credit to the finding of the
trial court that there was no fraud or misrepresentation,
the summons must be quashed. The court pointed out
that it taxed their credulity to the utmost to give credit
to the finding of good faith and honest purpose on
House's part in bringing Ellan into the state of Montana
but .stated further that, since the trial court had deterruined the conflict in the evidence on the subject of good
faith in favor of House, they would accept that finding
and give it full cognizance. The balance of the opinion
is as follows:
"The general rule is that when a non-resident
party to an action, or a witness, comes into the
state for the sole purpose of attending a trial, he
is immune from the service of process during his
attendance and for a reasonable period thereafter
to enable him to return to his home. Stewart v.
Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192;
Page Co. v. ~facdonald, 261 U.S. 446, 43 S. Ct. 416,
67 L. Ed. 737; State ex rei. Coe v. District Court,
supra. According to the weight of authority, this
rule applies to all proceedings which are in their
nature judicial, 'vhether taking place in court or
not (50 C.J. 554, and cases cited), and to attendance upon the taking of depositions to be used in
the trial of a c.au.se (50 C.J. 555, and cases cited).
The rule has been extended to include a party attending the examination of witnesses to be used
on a trial of his case (Plilnpton v. inslow [C.C.]
9 F. 365), and to such .a one 'vho comes into a foreign jurisdiction, at the request of his counsel,

,v. .
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to be present during the argument on a demurrer
(Kinne v. Lant [C.C.] 68 F. 436).
"The question before us is usually treated under the head of fraud and deceit in enticing a nonresident into the jurisdiction in order to secure
service upon him, and it is said that the service
should be set aside when the defendant is procured to come into the jurisdiction by pretense of
settlement. 50 C.J. 488; Olean St. Ry. Co. v. Fairmount Construction Co., 55 App. Div. 292, 67
N.Y.S. 165; Higgins v. Dewey (City Ct.) 13 N.Y.S.
570; Cav.anagh v. Manhattan Transit Co. (C.C.)
133 F. 818, 819; Alderson on Judicial Writs and
Process, § 126.
"We can conceive of no valid reason for the
differentiation. The law favors the compromise
and settlement of disputed claims (12 c·.J. 336),
and should protect a nonresident who comes into
this state at the solicitation of his adversary for
the purpose of attempting such ;a disposition of a
controversy, to the same extent as when one comes
here as a party to, or a witness in, a case in court.
As was said in Allen v. Wharton, 59 Hun. 622, 13
N.Y.S. 38, 39, respecting a situation similar to that
in the case at bar: 'Good f:aith on the part of the
plaintiff required that he should have permitted
the defendant again to leave this city without
making service of the summons when it became
evident that no settlement would be effected
through his agency. That was violated in making
the service which was made upon him. It wa.s a
breach of the confidence which had been inspired
• • * and the settled practice requires that the
service of the summons made, as this was made,
should not be permitt'ed to stand.' While there, as
here the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff
'
on conflicting
testimony, the appellate court in
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applying the 'enticement' rule s·aid that at the
time the plaintiff invited the defendant to come
to the state for fhe purpose of discussing a compromise or settlement, there probably lurked in
his mind the idea of suit and service if settlement
was not effected. This declaration detracts from
the rule announced, and we think it unneees.sary
to find the lower court's finding of good faith is
not justified by the evidence, but that the general
rule of immunity should apply.
"Fe·deral Judge Van Fleet, of California, in
discu.ssing the general rule, has said: 'Originally
it was asserted solely as the privilege of the court
for the protection of its own jurisdiction, but later
as that of the person concerned as well. Bacon's
Abr. tit. 'Privilege.' What the precise limits of
the right were in its earlier history, or those to
whom extended, it is not very material to here
inquire. * * * While it is quite true that the right
has most frequently arisen and been applied in
connection with parties and witnesses in judicial
proceedings, its extension in th'e process of time
to those engaged in other departments of the public service has been more largely by analogous
application by the courts than as a result of legislation.' Filer v. ~fcCornick (D.C.) 260 F. 309, 31±.
"Quoting from Stewart v. Ran1say, supra, it
is said: " 'Now, this great object in the administration of justice " . .ould in a variety of \Yays be
obstructed if parties and " . .itnesses were liable
to be served with process "~}rile actually attending
the court. It is often 1natter of great importance
to the citizen to prevent the institution and prosecU!tion of a suit in any court at a distance from
his ho1ne and his rnean,s. of defense ; .and the fear
that a suit rnay be corn1nenced the·re by smnmon'3
will as effectually prevent his approach as if capiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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as might be served upon him. This is especially
the case with citizens of neighboring states, to
whom the power which the court possesses of compelling attendance cannot reach.' It is these considerations which have actuated the courts in extending the protection of the rule, so limited in
the beginning, until it has come to embrace practically every one who may be called to a strange
jurisdiction in connection with a cause, and every
proceeding or step in the action, either heard before the court or any of its officers."

"A bona fide attempt to compromise and
settle a controversy without the trouble and expense of the institution of suit and the trial of the
cause is a more important step in connection with
the cause than argu1nent of a demurrer or the
taking of a deposition for the preservation of
testimony, and the general rule as to immunity
should be extended to cases wherein, as here,
a party to a controversy has been induced for this
purpose to come within rifle range, as it were,
under a flag of truce; if the purposes of the parley is not accomplished, honor and fair dealing
should dictate that such person be permitted u,
reasonable time within which to return to the
safety of the position from which he was induced
to withdraw, before his adversary goes into action." (Italics added.)
This decision was annotated in 93 A.L.R. at page
872, .and several cases are there discussed which are similar to the instant case, but in all of those cases the courts
appear to have concluded that fraud must be shown in
order to warrant the setting. aside of the service of summons and then to have concluded that inviting a non' into the state for the purpose of discussing settleresident
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ment of a controversy and then serving him with summons in a suit involving the controversy which was concerned in the invitation to come into the state, was, in
and of itself, sufficient fraud to warrant setting aside
the service of summons. As this defendant reads the
decision in the Ellan case, the Montana Supreme Court
is singular and outstanding in that it holds that a summons served under the.se circumstances should be quashed
whether or not fraud is found to exist.
It should be noted that the case at bar in this state
involves the exact question which was involved in the
Ellan case. A nonresident was invited into a foreign
state to discuss settlement of a pending controversy.
While in the foreign state for the sole purpose of the
discussion of settlement, the nonresident was served with
summons. He challenged the service of summons on the
ground that it was obtained by trick and artifice and the
trial court found that there was no trick or artifice. The
question is, then, whether the state of Utah will extend
the doctrine of immunity from service of summons to the
case at bar. This could be done on the same ground
adopted by all of the other courts except the ~fontana
court, that is, a finding that the facts shown are sufficient to make out the requisite fraud for setting aside the
service of summons or, in the .alternative, upon the
ground that public policy requires that a nonresident,
invited into the state for purposes of discussing the
settlement of an existing controversy, be inn11une fron1
service of .sunnnons 'vhile coining into the state, during
the negotiations, and for a sufficient time thereafter
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to enable him to return to the state of his residence·. The
appellant urges that this court abandon the circuitous
route, refuse to give lip service to the fiction of actual
fraud and state that the circumstances of this case require the summons to be quashed on the ground of immuni~ty from service of process.
Subsequent to the decision of the Ell:an case, supra,
a number of jurisdictions have referred to it, but in no
instance has the case at bar been on .all fours with the
Montana case, and in no case has it been overruled or
rejected.
The Supreme Court of the State of Iowa in Moseley
v. Ricks, 274 N.W. 23, goes carefully into the rationale
behind the principle of law extending immunity from
service of process to persons who are within the state as
parties or witnesses in judicial proceedings. In a substantial majority of the jurisdictions immunity has been
extended to proceedings which are not strictly judicial
proceedings. This extension is discussed at 35 A.L.R.
1353, wherein Urtah is cited as a state which follows the
rule extending the immunity from service to include persons who are within the state as parties or witnesses in a
proceeding which is not strictly judicial. See Cooke v.
Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83, decided in 1926. The said
Cooke case involves a very long opinion and the only
point of interest to us here is Point 18 of the syllabus.
This case is cited to show that Utah follow.s the more
libe:val rule in this regard and it is not contended that the
Cooke case is determinative of the issues before the
court in the instant matter.
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After the detennination of Moseley v. Ricks, supra,
the Supreme Court of Iowa was again called upon to discuss the holding of the Ellan case. In Lingo v. Reichenbach Land Company et al., 27 N.W. 121, counsel for the
defendant claimed to come within the protection of the
doctrine advanced in the Ellan case. The Iowa court
held that the facts were dissimilar and the summons
should not be quashed. In discussing the Ellan case,
however, .iJheJ Iowa court indicated that the Supreme
Court of Montana had really held that bad faith or fraud
was required and had found that it existed in. the case
before it. Appellant cannot agree with this interpretation.
In Lingo v. Reichenbach Land Company et al.,
supra, the nonresident defendant, Reichenbach, was the
plaintiff in a case then pending in another county in
Iowa. His eounsel in that case got in touch with the
counsel for the defendant and requested a meeting-_bet,veen Reichenbach, himself and them. The stated purpose of this conference \vas to be a discussion of settlement in the other matter. There 'vas no discussion of
the Lingo controversy. The n1eeting \vas held in Iowa
and the case then pending in the other county was discussed, but no agree1nent 'vas reached. ·\'Vl1en he left the
office where the conference \vas held, Reichenbach \vas
served with a su1nn1ons in the Lingo suit. The attorneys
for Lingo 'vere the srune .attorneys \vith whom the conference had just been held. The Supre1ne Court of Iowa
carefully and clearly pointed out first, that the n1eeting
to discuHs settlen1ent \vas brought about and arranged by
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Reichenbach's attorney, not Lingo's, and the situation was
not one where a resident plaintiff had invited a nonresident· defendant to come into the state to discuss
settlement, and second, that the action in which the suit
was brought involved a wholly different matter from
that in regard to which the conference was held. These
facts distinguish the Lingo case from the Ellan case.
As appellant reads the Lingo case. he gets the impression
that the Supreme Court of Iow~a would quash service of
summons in a case such as the Ellan case, and in the case
at bar, but would do so upon the grounds that the facts
shown are sufficient to constitute enough bad faith to
vitiate the service.
Appellant finds no case involving an invitation by a
resident to a nonresident to come in the s~tate for the
purpose ·of attempting to settle an existing controversy,
the failure of the settlement discussion, and the service
of summons in a suit on the same controversy, in which
the court conclude·d that the summons was properly
served and should not be quashed.
Although the trial court app:arently found against it,
there is te·stimony of plaintiff's officers and agents in
the record from which it could have been found that the
invitation to defendant and the subsequent .service of
summons were not wholly in good faith. W. S. Wagstaff,
President of the plaintiff corporation, stated (R. 44) that
he had contemplated the possibility of legal action against
l\1r. Berry around the first of the year, 1956. Mr. Olson,
(R. 49) the General Sales Manager for the plaintiff, in a
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portion of his deposition which was introduced because
of a conflict between it and his testimony at the hearing,
gave the following testimony indicating that the possibility of suing Mr. Berry had been discussed prior to
the invitation to come to Utah, and that there had been
some discussion ·of Mr. Berry's nonresident status, as
follows (R. 49 and 50):
"Mr. Tanner: (Reading)
Q. During this period of time, during the first
five months, that would be up until June 1st,
1956, did you oontemplate the possibility of
suing Mr. Berry over the points of difference
between the Company and Mr. Berry?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. Did you discu,ss that with anyone Y
A.

Yes, I discussed it with Mr. 'Vagstaff.

Q. Did you discuss it with Mr. Boren Y
A.

Yes.

Q. When would that discussion have taken place
to the best of your recollection Y
A. I couldn't give you a d~ate on that. I don't
know.
Q. It would have been prior to June 1st, wouldn't

it'
A.

Yes.

Q. And had you personally concluded that it may
be necessary to sue him Y
A.

I think that I felt there 'vas a good possibility
that we would have to sue hin1.
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Q.

So that subject had been in your mind prior to
June 1st~
A. The possibility of it, yes.

Q. Have you ever discussed with Mr. Boren or
Mr. W agst:aff whether such a suit could be
brought in the state of Utah or not~
A.

I don't quite unde.rstand your question.

Q. What I am driving at is this: Mr. Berry lives
in Idaho and the Company is here in Utah.
Have you ever discussed with either Mr.
Wagstaff or Mr. Boren whether suit, if
brought, would have to he brought in one
plaee or the other~
A.

I think there was some limited amount of
discussion on that point.

Q. Do you remember the nature of it~

A. It would he very vague."
Mr. Boren, again in a portion of a deposition introduced because of a conflict between it and the testimony
. .
at the hearing, testified as follows (R. 60) :
"Q.

Did you eve·r advise Mr. Berry prior to the
time he was served with summons in this
action that he could expect suit to be brought
against him~

A.

No, I don't think so. I might qualify that by
saying we never came right out and told him
we would sue him."
CONCLUSION

Defendant respectfully requests this court to reverse
the ruling of the trial court and hold that the motion to
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quash should be granted under the facts and circumstances of this case for the reason that the defendant
vvas inrmune from service of process in this case while in
Utah in response to the invitation of the plaintiff to
come to Utah and discuss settling the controversy which
is the subject of this suit. In this regard it should be
again pointed out that the sole purpose of the defendant
in coming into the state of Utah was to confer with the
officers of the plaintiff in regard to the settlement of this
controversy, that, upon entering the state he drove directly to plaintiff's place of business and that, upon
leaving, he went directly from plaintiff's place of business back to Rexburg, Idaho.
Appellant further contends that, in the event this
court feels that had faith is .an essential prerequisite to
the quashing of service of summons, it should hold that
serving summons on a nonresident who has come into
the state at the request of the plaintiff for the sole purpose of discussing settlement of the controversy sued
on is sufficient evidence of bad faith to invalidate the
serVIce.
Respectfully submitted,

EARL D. TANNER
Attorney for Appellant
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